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During  the transition  to a market  economy,  cash social benefits
in the formerly  socialist  countries  must  become  more  targeted  as
well as smaller in absolute amounts. The reforrming  socialist
economies  are likely to follow the corporatist  earnings-linked
model  of continental  Europe.
Pdicy Re eawh  WoidngPaps  d!aiatete  Snfinngs  of  woik  in  prgress and  enwoungethe  exchange  of ideas  anongBank stffand
flUothe  wnuescd in  devlopmnatissucs.nTheepapers,  disted  by  theResgrchAdvisoy  Suaff,cany thenames  oftheauthors,  eflea
ony thrviews.  andhiouldbousdd  and  cihelBcordinglyf  dhe  ingo . inrtsmen,  oadconclions  am  e  theauthoro'owvn.  lheyshould

















































































































Transition  and Macro-Adjustment
WPS 1054
This paper-  a product  of the Transition  and Macro-Adjustment  Division,  Country  Economics  Depart-
ment - is part of a larger effort in the department  to study income distribution  in formerly socialist
countries.  Copies  of the  paper are available  free  from the World  Bank, 1818  H Street  NW, Washington,
DC 20433. Please  contact  Sabah  Moussa,  room  Nl 1-017,  extension  39019  (December  1992,  39 pages).
Milanovic  empiricaUy  explores  the distributional  of public spending  on primary  education.  As the
impact  of social  transfers  in cash and in kind in  level of schooling  rises,  the distribution  of
Russia and Eastem Europe.  education  benefits  resembles  more closely  the
distribution  of income.
He shows  that cash transfers,  on the whole,
are distributed  almost  uniformly  (equally  per  Health  care benefits  are  distributed  uni-
capita) regardless  of one's position  in income  formly,  per capita.  In market economies,  on the
distribution.  By contrast,  in market  economies,  other hand, public  health benefits  are targeted
absolute  amounts  of cash transfers  decline  as one  more  to the poor  - primarily  because  the rich
moves up the income  ladder.  often  opt out of publicly-run  programs.
The family allowance  is the only type of  During  the transition,  cash benefits in the
cash transfer  that is somewhat  focused  on the  fonmerly  socialist  countries  must become  more
poor in the socialist  economies.  Family  allow-  targeted  as well as smaller  in absolute  amounts.
ances  are paid for children,  and since  larger  The reforming  socialist  economies  are likely to
households  are  typically  poorer, some redistribu-  follow  the corporatist  earnings-linked  model of
ton  is achieved.  continental  Europe.
Education  benefits  are also slaf..'  d slightly
toward the poor, primarily  through  the high share
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Rankings  of Recipients  Vary:  The  Four  Rules
When calculating  inequality  and distributional  incidence  of social
transfers several  methodological problems  exist  that  often  hinder
comparisons.  They can be divided  into four groups: (1)  concept  of income
used; (2) type of recipient;  (3) the ranking  criter!on; (4)  grouped or
individual  data. First, income  distribution  analyses often use various
income  concepts:  original,  gross,  disposable  income  or even a variant  of
these.  Second,  the  recipients  vary:  they  are either  households  or persons.
Third,  the  ranking  criterion  is  different.  In  some studies,  households  are
ranked  by total household  income; In others, households  or persons are
ranked  by household  per capita  income;  finally,  some data show households
or persons  ranked  by household  equivalent  Income (where  household  income
Is adjusted  for consumption  needs of various  household  members).  Fourth,
data may be shown In such a form that recipients  are grouped.  Instead  of
Individual  data that pertain  to several  thousand  households  one may have
only a dozen of data points.  All  income  distribution  statistics  are then
approximations.  However,  it can be shown that already  with a dozen data
points,  the approximation  is very accurate. Moreover,  the bounds  within
which the  "true"  values  of different  statistics  lie  can  be calculated.  The
approximation  error Is therefore  small  and I shall  not dwell on it any
further.
The problems become compounded  In the incidence  analysis.  This Is
because  in the incidence  analysis  we focus  on particular  types  of Income
(say, family allowances).  While small variations In one of the three
elements  mentioned  above  need  not  vitiate  comparisons of  income
distribution  between the countries,  they  may strongly  affect  comparisons
of  transfer progressivity.  While we know,  from theory and  empirical
1  Davies and Shorrocks (1989,  pp.101-2)  show that with an "optimal"
grouping  the  Gini coefficient  calculated  on the  basis  of only five income
groups is equal to 95 percent  of the value of the "true"  Gini; with 12
groups  the convergence  is within  1 percent  of true  value.  They conclude:
"The  error is negligible  relative  to the likely  sampling  and nonsampling
errors  in the 'true'  Gini itself"  (p.102).  See also Jenkins (1988,  p.71)
who shows that the  effect  of reranking  (violation  of horizontal  inequity)
dominates  the effect  of grouping:  "the effect of grouping is relatively
minor, leading  to differences  in estimates  of the  Gini coefficient  of at
most 2%...  The pure reranking  effect  is significantly  larger  however...  The
difference  is  of the  order  of 5-6%".
1researcn, some  relationships between  "real"  income  inequality and
inequality obtained when  income  *or  recipients are  presented  in  a
particular  fashion,  we ignore such relationships  for individLal  income
sources.  For example,  If Income  data  for a country  A are  presented  in the
form DMHNyH),  i.e.  the  distribution  of households  (H)  by total income  per
household  (YH),  and the  data for country  B In the form  D(plyp  ),  i.e.,  the
distribution  of persons (p)  by per capita  household  income (y  p), we can
expect that, ceteris  paribus,  I(HlyH)>I(plyp),  where I is an inequality
measure.  This  occurs  because  household  total  income  and  household  size  are
positively correlated.  "Per capitalization"  then moves both small and
large households  towards  the middle of income  distribution  and reduces
income  dispersion.  But when we find that the incidence  of unemployment
compensations  is different  in country  A from that in country  B, we lack  a
priori  judgment  whether  It  may be due  to different  forms  In  which the  data
are displayed  or to some "real"  differences.  The purpose  of this section
is to see how different  data presentations  may affect calculations  of
transfer  progressivity.
Table  1. ILLUSTRATION  OF TRANSFER  PROGRESSIVITY
Total  Concentr/
Households  I  II  III  IV  V  income  Gini coef.
Original  Income  10  15  20  25  30  100  20.0
Social  transfers  10  4  3  1  0  18  -51.1
Gross  Income  20  19  23  26  30  118  9.5  *
Taxes  0  1  4  4  5  14  40.0
Disposable  income  20  18  19  22  25  104  6.1
Note:  *  indicates  the  Gini coefficient.
'Let  us consider  first the income  concept  used and suppose  that all
other problems  are solved.  We have five households  ranked by original
(market)  Income  as shown in Table 1. The vector  of social  transfers  is
(10,4,3,1,0)  and the  concentration  coefficient  (C)  is -51.1.  Its  negative
value  shows  that  transfers  are  negatively  correlated  with original  income:
the greater is the value of the coefficient  in the absolute  amount, the
2better  targeted  are the transfers. 2 With  a negative  C the concentration
curve  of transfers  lies  above  t)he  450  line  (Figure  1).
Figure  1
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The concentration  coefflcient  of transfers  (C) can be used as an
Indicator  of transfer  progressivity  (P)3  because,  by definition,  P=C-G
where  G=the  Gini  coefficient  of overall  income  and  G=given.  Moreover,  when
we  compare two countries,  C  Is a  better indicator  of  targeting  of
transfers  than  P  because  its  value  is independent  of  G. (In  Figure  1,  C Is
equal  to  twice  the  area  between  the  concentration  curve  and  450  line;  P is
equal  to twice  the area between  the concentration  curve  and the Lorenz
curve.)  rhus,  in  a very  inegalitarian  country  transfers  may appear  fairly
progressive  even  if they  are  less  focused  than  in  an egalitarian  country.
For  example,  equal  per  capita  transfers  In  Brazil  (C=0)  would  appear  very
progressive  because  its  Gini coefficient  Is  very high (say  equal  to 50):
2  The concentration  coefficient  for  a transfer  s can  be written  as C -
2covar(s,ry)/sN  where  s = mean  amount  of transfer,  N - sample  size,  and
covar(s,r  y) =  covariance  between  s and ranking  of recipients  according
to  total  income.
3  Progressivity  compares the  distribution of  an  income source
(transfer)  or a tax  with the  distribution  of (say)  gross income.  In the
case  of taxation,  when  the  share  of taxes  in  gross  Income  increases  with
an increase  in income,  we say  that  taxes  are  progressive.  Conversely,  for
transfers,  when the  share  of transfers  in  gross  income  decreases  with the
level  of income,  we say  that  transfers  are  progressive.
3then P=0-50=-50.  Much more focused transfers in Sweden  (C=-20)  would
appear  less progressive because Swedish G  is  low  (say  20);  then
P=-20-20=-40.  If we are interested  in transfers'  impact  on Inequality,
there may  be some justification  In using P  or Dalton's progressivity
measure (the  difference  between the pre- and post-transfer  inequality).
If, however, we  are  Interested,  as  here we  are,  in  targeting, the
concentration  coefficieiit  Is  to be preferred. 4
Now, to return to our example,  If we let households  be ranked by
their  gross income,  the vector  of social  transfers  becomes (4,10,3,1,0).
No  longer does  the poorest household receive the  highest transfer.
Concentration  coefficient  declines (in absolute amounts) and  becomes
-37.8.  Transfers  thus appear less targeted  on the poor because the poor
are now  defined  as those  with low  gross  and  not original  income.  If  we go
further  and let households  be ranked  by disposable  income,  the vector  of
social  transfers  will look (4,3,10,1,0).  The concentration  coefficient  of
transfers  becomes -12.5. The negative  correlation  between transfers  and
disposable  income  is even weaker.  The reasons  for this are clear.  Poor
households  according to original income  receive  high transfers  and pay
little taxes. When measured in terms of dispcsable income, they thus
overtake  some households  that started  with higher original income.  Our
conclusion  regarding  the progressivity  of transfers  therefore  depends  on
the  underlying  income  concept  used.  This is the  first  rule:
(1)  calculated  progressivity  of transfers  wJll tend  to  decrease  as we
move from ranking the recipients according to original incogie  to
ranking  the  recipients  according  to  gross  and  disposable  income.
The  problem  that  we just  discussed  emerges  because  of rank reversals
(called  also "horizontal  inequity").  Generally,  the greater the overall
amount of  transfers,  the more  likely are  such rank reversals simply
because  large  transfer  flows  cannot  be so  well calibrated  that  everybody's
relative position remains unchanged. Small  overall transfers can  be
focused  on a few poor and will not produce  rank reversals.  Even If badly
focused,  they  will not  lead to  numerous  rank reversals  because  they  affect
4  Note  also that  with the  concentration  coefficient  issues  of reranking
that  plague  the  calculations  of redistribution  do not  appear.
For example,  using British  data for 1987,  concentration  coefficient
Is -34.5 when households  are ranked according to original income, and
-21.6  when they  are ranked  according  to disposable  income.  Calculated  from
United  Kingdom  Central  Statistical  Office  (1990,  Appendix  4).
4only few recipients.)  If we fit the regression  on  the sample of ten
capitalist  economies 6,where horizontal Inequity (HI) is the dependent
variable,  and  size  of  transfers  (SIZE)  and  their  concentratlon
coefficients (CONCENTRATION)  are  explanatory variables, we  obtain a
statistically  significant positive value  for  the  size and  negative,
although not  statistically significant, value  for  the  concentration
(t-values  are shown  between  brackets). 7
HI  =  0.333  SIZE - 0.011  CONCENTRATION  (1)
(5.43)  (0.40)
2
R  =  0.77  SE =  2.08
DW=  2.18  F  26.5
Our second  rule is that:
(2)  horizontal  Inequity  will tend  to increase  as the total  amount  of
transfers increases. Consequer%tly,  rule  (1) will  be  stronger in
countries  with large  transfers.
Let  us introduce  a further  complication  and  consider  if  progressivity
of transfers  is affected  by the form of income  In which recipients  are
ranked,  i.e.  whether  by total  household  income,  Income  per capita  etc.  Let
transfers  (T)  be directly  related  to the  number  of non-active  members  of
household (Ni) and negatively related to household income per  capita
(y/N),  where  y =  income and  N =  household  size.  We can  write  this  as:
T =  aNI  - b(y/N)
If there  is a positive  and (for  simplicity)  proportional  relation  between
N and  Ni,  we can  write:
T =  a f(N) - b(y/N)  =  cN - b(y/N)  (1)
where  c,b>O.
We know that the  relationship  between  total  household  income,  y, and
household  size, N, is positive.  There are two possibilities:  household
6  These are Australia,  Switzerland,  France,  West Germany,  Norway,  the
Netherlands,  the  United States,  Sweden,  Canada  and the UK. The data are
for the  period  1979-81.  They are  extracted  from  Mitchell  (1991,  p. 135).
7  The  equation  Is  fitted  through  the  origin  because  with zero transfers
or concentration  there  cannot  be ranking-reversals.
8  Calculated  targeting  on the  poor  will decrease  faster  as we move from
original  to disposable  income  in  Sweden  than in  Australia.
9  Any  of the  above  income  concepts.  We keep income  concept  fixed.
5size  Increases  slower  than  Income  so that  rankings  of recipients  according
to total  and  per capita  income  coincide  (the  convex  curve In  Figure  2),
or, household size increases  faster than income so  that ranking of
recipients  by per capita  income  are the  reverse  of the  rankings  according
to total  income  (concave  curve  B In  Figure  2).  In  both  cases,  the  equation
will  be:
y  =  a + AN + IN2 (2)
Figure  2
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The  relationship  between  total  transfers  T  and  total  income  y can  now
be  written  as:
T =  cN - b(y/N)  =  c V(y)  - b(y/N)  (3)
where  N=*(y)  is  the  reverse  of  equation  (2).  The  slope  of (3)  is:
dT  b  c  b
=  cW'(y)  - -__  =  _  ___  (4)
dy  N  9  +  27N  N
where  we make  use  of  dy/dN  = $  + 2'N.
The relationship  between  transfers  per capita  and income  per capita
is:
---  = c - bt  Y J 
N  N  N
and  the  slope
_d(T/N)_  ()
d(y/N)  N
6Since  the  relationship between  y  and  N  is  positive,  then
dy/dN=f3+27N>O.  Therefore  expression  (4)  must be greater than (5). For a
sufficiently  large  c, (4)  may  be even  positive.  This  means  that,  while  T/N
must always decrease as Income  per capita (y/N)  goes up, total T may
decrease  by less or even increase  as total  income  increases.  Targeting  of
transfers  will therefore  appear  better  when  households  are  ranked  by their
per capita  income  (and  transfers  are shown  in per capita  terms)  than  when
households  are ranked  by their  overall  income  (and  transfers  are shown  In
total).  Our third  rule is:
(3)  progressivity  increases  with  per  capitalization  of  income.
The conclusion crucially  depends on  the existence of a  positive
relation  between  overall  household  income  and household  size but not on
its  exact  form (convexity  or concavity). 10
Uniform  per capita  transfers  when plotted  against income  per capita
imply,  from (5),  b=O. This situation  is characteristic,  as we shall  see,
for  East European  economies.  It  means  that transfers  are unrelated  to per
capita  income  levels.
Rule (3) enables us to make a  tentative  conclusion  regarding  the
effect  of  equalization of  income  (adjustment  to  take  into  account
different  consumption  needs  of  various  household  members).  Per
capitalization  is an extreme  form of equalization  where each individual
receives  the same  weight  of 1. Since  equalization  is a milder  form of per
capitalization,  equalization  will increase  the  calculated  progressivity  of
transfers  by less.
Our findings  are illustrated  on a real  world  example  calculated  from
the French  data (Table  2).11 The concept  of income is always the same:
original income. When households are ranked by  their overall income,
progressivity  of social  transfers  ("ensemble  des prestations  publics")  is
only  -14.4:  they  are  barely  larger  in  absolute amounts for  poor
households.  When households  are ranked  by household equivalent  income,
progressivity  is  -52.9;  when  households  are  ranked  by household  per capita
10  Convexity  or concavity  is reflected  in the sign  of Z.  But in either
case  13+27N  must be positive.
11  Calculations  are  based  on Canceill  (1989,  Tables  SI-13  to  SI-17),  for
all employed  and non-active  population.  The same conclusion  can be made
from Jarvis and  Micklewright (1992, p.30)  data  reported for  family
allowances  in  Hungary.
7Income,  progressivity  is  -59.9.  Table  2 also  shows  that  when  individuals,
instead  of households,  are ranked  according  to the same  criterion,
progressivity  is reduced.  This is due to the fact that with per
capitalization,  low  income  households  are  generally  large  households.  When
households  rather  than  Individuals  are  ranked  by  their  per  capita  Incomes,
progressivity  will  appear  very  high  because  transfers  are  concentrated  on
relatively  few  households;  when,  on the  contrary,  individuals  are  ranked
by  their  household  per  capita  incomes,  the  large  size  of poor  households
"diffuses"  the  concentration  of transfers  (renders  them  less  focused).  12
This  is  our  fourth  rule:
(4)  distributions  of the  D(pl.)  type will yield lower  progressivity
than the  distribution  of the  DC(H.)  type.
Table  2.  PROGRESSIVITY OF  SOCIAL  TRANSFERS AS  A  FUNCTION
OF  TYPE OF  RECIPIENT
Households  Persons
ranked  ranked
D(H|.  )  D(pl.
Household  total  Income  -14.41  n.a.
Equivalent  Income  -52.93  -44.80
Per  capita  Income  -59.90  -48.20
The  calculated  progressivity  or  targeting  of  transfers  will  therefore
be  greater:
(a)  if  recipients  are  ranked  by  original  than  by  gross  or  disposable
income;
(b)  if  overall  size  of  transfers  is  small;
(c)  if  recipients  are  ranked  by their  per  capita  rather  than  total
household  income;
(d)  if  recipients  are  defined  to  be  households  rather  than  persons.
In  a two-way  classification,  shown  in Table  3, progressivity  of a
12  The  importance  of  units  used  In  the  analysis  of Incidence  of social
transfers  is underlined  in Selden  and Wasylenko  (1992)  who show that
education  benefits  In  Peru  are  less  pro-poor  when  only  children  (ch)  are
ranked  by their  per  capita  family  income,  D(chlyp),  then  when  all  persons
are so ranked  D(ply  p). Thus, if all individuals  are ranked  by their
household  per capita  income,  the concentration  coefficient  of primary
education  benefits is  -12.7; if  children  only are  included,  the
concentration  coefficient  falls  to -0.6;  for secondary  education,  the
values  are  respectively  0.7  and  4.1 (calculated  from  Selden  and  Wasylenko
(1990;  Tables  3C  and  4C,  pages  24  and  31)).
8given transfer  will appear  the greatest if distribution  is of the form
D(Hlyp) and y=original  income.  As we move to the right and up from the
MAXIMUM  point,  calculated  progressivity  decreases.  It  will  be the  smallest
if  D(plyH)  where  y =  disposable  income.
Table  3. PROGRESSIVITY  OF SOCIAL  TRANSFERS  AS A FUNCTION
OF TYPE  OF INCOME AND  RECIPIENT
Income  Original  Gross  Disposable
Household  total  Inc.  MINIMUM
Equivalent  income  M
Per capita  income  MAXIMUM  X  Xi
In the  empirical  analysis  that  follows  we are understandably  limited
by the available data. In the calculation  of progressivity,  we  shall
attempt to  use  the  data  that are  methodologically  as  laentical as
possible:  most often,  this  would  be the  distribution  of persons  according
to  household per  capita gross  income, D(py  p)  (the point  X  in our
classification).  It  will be explicitly  Indicated  when other types  of data
are used.  Our choice  is determined  by the type  of data generated  by East
European statistical  offices that normally rank households or persons
according  to  gross  per  capita  income.13  Mitchell  (1991),  for  example,  using
Luxembourg Income Study data,  analyzes progressivity  by  looking how
transfers  are  distributed  when  households  are  ranked  according  to  original
equivalent  income  (point  M).
13  It should  be noted,  however,  that the  East European  gross income  is
somewhat  different from the Western gross income. East European gross
income  is income  after deduction  of payroll taxes (deducted  at source).
Since payroll taxes account for quasi totality of direct taxes, East
European  gross income  is fairly  close to disposable  income (point  X' in
Table  2).  Only Hungary  is an exception  to this rule because  its taxation
system  was already  overhauled  in 1989 in  accordance  with that  existing  in
market  economies.
9Section  2. Distributional  Incidence  of  Cash Social  Transfers
Cash social transfers included  in household surveys in five East
European countries (Poland,  Hungary, Czechoslovakia,  former  Yugoslavia,
Bulgaria)  and  Russia  are  the  following:
pensions  (all pension schemes are  state-provided),
various  family  allowances,  14
sickness  benefits,  15
scholarships,  and
other  social  transfers.
The magnitude of social transfers,  in percent of household gross
income,  and their  concentration  coefficients  are shown in Table 4.16 The
year of analysis  for all  countries  is 1989 (except  for Czechoslovakia  and
Yugoslavia 1988). All  data  for  these  countries, except when  noted
otherwise, are  calculated from household surveys. The description of
household surveys and  the  discussion of  some  methodological issues
regarding  the  surveys  are  presented  in  Annex 1.
The size and  distribution  of social  transfers  are remarkably  similar
in  three Central European countries (Poland, CSFR  and  Hungary) and
Bulgaria.  Yugoslavia  and Russia  are different.  Social  transfers  in cash
account for between 21 and 25 percent of household  gross income17 in
14  Exact  types  of family  allowances  vary  slightly  between  the  countries.
Poland's  surveys  distinguish  between  universal  family  allowances  (paid  in
respect of dependent child or  spouse), child care benefits (paid if
dependent child requires prolonged medical treatment),  and  maternity
allowances (to compensate for  earnings during the maternity leave).
Czechoslovak  surveys  show the data on child care benefits  and maternity
allowances. Hungarian data  include child  care  benefits and  family
allowances.  Bulgarian  data combine all family allowances.  Russian data
include  maternity,  social  security  allowance,  and grants  paid in respect
of children.  Finally,  Yugoslav  data include  only  family  allowances  (income
tested).
15  In  some  countries (Poland and  Bulgaria) sickness benefits are
entirely borne by  enterprises  and  thus are  not  shown as  government
(social)  transfers.
416  A  concentration coefficient shows  the  concentration (cumulative
percentage  received)  of one variable,  (e.g.  pension),  when recipients  are
ranked  by amounts of a different  variable (e.g.  gross income).  In the
special  case  when the  two  variables  coincide  the  concentration  coefficient
is  equal  to the  Gini  coefficient.  For more  details  see  Annex  2.
17  Gross  income  is  equal  to  original  income  (wages  plus  net
self-employment  income plus property income plus other  income before
government  redistribution)  plus  social  cash  transfers.  Gross  income  is the
10Central European countries and Bulgaria, and  less than 15 percent in
Russia  and  former  Yugoslavia.
Table  4. STRUCTURE  AND  DISTRIBUTION  OF SOCIAL  TRANSFERS
(all  households)
Percent  of gross  income  POL  YUGOc/ CSFR  HUN  BULG  RUS
Pensions  15.2  12.1  16.5  13.4  16.6  8.0
Family  allowances  5.5  0.5  5.6  6.0  2.3  2.6
Sickness  benefits  0.5  3.0  2.0
Scholarships  0.2  0.2  2.3  0.3
Other  social  transfers  1.4  0.2  0.2  0.8  3.8
Total  transfers  22.1  13.5  25.4  22.4  21.2  14.6
Concentration  coefficients
Pensions  -2.6  29.9  8.1  9.5  10.9  -19.6
Family  allowances  -12.3  -19.9  -28.4  -21.9  -17.2  1.5
Sickness  benefits  31.0  13.3  22.1
Scholarships  50.1  9.3  5.3  19.8
Other  social  transfers  14.2  -24.6  -19.5  -11.7  12.1
Total  transfers  -3.9  37.1  0.3  1.4  7.2  -6.8
(t-values)  (-2.4)  (7.4)  (0.2)  (1.5)  (1.8)  (-5.6)
Gross  income  b/  26.1  32.2  19.5  24.8  21.7  21.9
a/ Standard  errors of concentration  coefficients  for all transfers
are  calculated  using  the jackknife technique suggested by  Sandstrom,
Wretman  and  Walden  (1988,  p.116).
b/  Gross  income (after payroll taxes) for  all  countries except
Hungary  where  gross income  before  taxes,  and Yugoslavia,  gross  revenues.
c/  Data for  Yugoslavia  from  Vukotic-Cotic  (1991).
Note:  =  significant  at 5 percent.
** =  significant at 1 percent.
The share  of pensions  in household  gross income  is contained  within
an even narrowed  range:  between  12 percent  in Yugoslavia  and 16.5  percent
in Hungary and Bulgaria. In Russia, the share of pensions is only 8
percent which is due  to relatively  low level of Russian pensions in
comparison  to other countries (Table  5). Low level  of pensions is also
responsible  for  Russia's  good "targeting  by default"  of pensions.  Because
central income  concept that I use. Disposable.  income  is equal to gross
income  minus direct personal  taxes.  Since direct  personal taxes in all
countries studied here except Hungary are negligible,  there is little
difference  between  gross  and  disposable  income.
11pensions  are low and households  that receive  them have few other sources
of income,  pensioners In Russia are poor more often than in the East
European countries.  Consequently,  pensions  appear more targeted  on the
poor and their concentration  coefficient  Is negative (-19.6) In Russia,
while it is close to zero in Poland (-2.8),  mildly positive in CSFR,
Hungary  and Bulgaria (between  8 mnd 11),  and strongly  positive  in former
Yugoslavia.
Table  5.  PENSION  AS PERCENTAGE  OF AVERAGE  STATE  SECTOR  WAGE
Yugoslavia  (1988)  68.6
Hungary  (1989)  66.9
CSFR (1988)  48.7
Bulgaria  (1988)  47.3
Poland  (1989)  45.4
Soviet  Union (1988)  36.5
In Poland,  CSFR, Hungary  and Bulgaria,  social  transfers  as a whole
are distributed  almost  equally  per capita.  Concentration  coefficients  are
very small and, with the exception of Poland, are not  statistically
significantly  different from  zero  (Table 4).  (A  zero  concentration
coefficient  indicates  a complete  per capita  equality.)  Practically  flat
distribution of  social  transfers across  the population is  in  sharp
contrast  to the situation  in market economies  where cash transfers  are
focused on  the  poorer segments of  the population (Figure 3).  i  The
concentration  coefficients  of cash transfers  in market economies in our
sample  (Table  6) range  from  -20 to  -44.
8  The increase  in transfers  between  the  first  and the second  decile  in
the UK and Sweden occurs because individuals  in the second and  third
income  decile receive  most of the transfers  in the form of relatively
higher pensions  while those in the lowest  decile receive them as lower
non-contributory  benefits  (welfare).
12Figure  3
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Sources:  Sweden:  calculated  from Bishop,  Formby  and Thistle (1990,  Table
3). United Kingdom: calculated  from United Kingdom Central Statistical
Office (1992,  Table 4 Appendix  1, p.142).  Poland  and Hungary:  Calculated
from  household  surveys.
Year and ranking criteria:  Sweden: 1981, ranking  according to original
income.  UK: 1989, households  ranked according to equivalent  disposable
income. Hungary: 1989, individuals  ranked according to household per
capita  disposable  income.  Poland,  1989  and CSFR,  1988,  individuals  ranked
according  to  household  per  capita  gross  income.
Flat line in Figure  3 means that transfers  do not depend  on income
(b=O)  but only  on household  size.
Among East European countries,  former Yugoslavia is an  exception
because  the  distribution of  social  transfers  approximates the
distribution  of  gross  income.  This  is  due  to  "republicanization"  of
pension  and  social  welfare  funds,  that  is  absence  of a centralized  welfare
system. "Republicanization"  made possible the existence of significant
differences  in average pension levels (reflecting  differences  in wages)
between  richer  and  poorer  republics.
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For all economies  the ranking  of individuals  or households  is done
according  to  gross Income;  only for  Hungary  the ranking  is  done according
to disposable  income.  Data for developed  market  economies  are calculated
from O'Higgins,  Schmaus and Stephenson  (1989,  Table 4) and refer to the
period  1979-82.  Data for socialist  economies  are from the surveys.  Since
the  data for market  economies  are of the  form D(HIyH)  while the  data for
socialist  economies  and Chile are of the form D(plyp) transfers  would
appear  somewhat  less progressive  in market  economies (see  Rule 3 above).
The  opposite  effect  is exerted  by the  fact that  gross income  in socialist
economies  is practically  the  same  as disposable  income  (see  Rule 1).  Data
for Chile include  state-mandated  pensions;  they  are for the  year 1987 and
are  calculated from  Haindl, Budinich and  Irarrazaval (1989, Table
1.10-1.12,  pp.  47-9).
For comparability  purposes,  I  have used in  Table  6 only such  data  for
market  economies  where  households  are ranked  according  to gross income.  19
The more frequently  available  data,  where  households  are ranked  according
19  Another problem that affects the comparison  between socialist and
market economies is the share of pensions that are state-provided  or
state-mandated  in market economies.  If most or all pensions  are either
paid out through  the intermediation  of the  state (as in Germany,  Sweden,
Norway) the comparison  is meaningful.  If, however,  a sizable  portion of
pensions is provided either by enterprise  pension plans or  is fully
voluntary through individual  saving, the comparison  is biased. This is
be  use  pensions,  due to their  correlations  with earnings,  are  always  less
progressive than other  social transfers. The  result is  that social
transfers  as a whole appear less targeted  in countries  with large  state
pension  plans.  Among the  market  economies  in Table  6, almost  all pensions
are state-administered  or state-mandated  in Sweden  (94.3  percent  of total
pension  expenditures),  Norway (92.4  percent),  Germany (89.0  percent)  and
the UK (88.4  percent).  In the US and Canada,  social  security  and public
sector  pensions  account for respectively  79 and 62 percent of pensions
(data  for 1980;  from  Esping-Andersen,  1990,  p. 85).
14to  original  Income,  show,  as explained  In  Section  1,  greater  progressivity
of transfers.
Family allowances play a  very  important role  in  three  Central
European countries.  They are, after pensions, the most important  cash
transfer  with the  share in  gross income  of 5 to 6 percent.  This contrasts
with  an average  share  of 1-1.5  percent  in  West  European  market  economies.  20
Because  various  family  allowances  in  CSFR and Hungary  are  paid in respect
to children  or non-working  spouse  there is not much difference  between
workers'  and farmers'  households  (Table  7). In Poland,  family  allowances
are not paid to private farmers and the difference between them and
workers is substantial.  In the former  Yugoslavia,  family  allowances  were
means  tested (concentration  coefficient  equal  to -20)  and fairly  small in
size compared to other socialist countries (0.5 percent of household
income).
Table  7. SIZE  OF FAMILY  ALLOWANCES
(in  percentage  of gross income)
individuals  or households  ranked  by gross  per capita  income)
POL  CSFR  HUN  BULG  RUS  UK  FRA
1989  1988  1989  1989  1989  1989  1984
Workers  7.2  5.4  6.3  2.5
Farmers  0.5  6.4  7.4  1.2
All households  5.5  5.6  6.0  2.3  2.6  1.6  3.2
(1)  Concentration  coeff.
for  gross Income
minus  family  allow.  26.7  22.4  27.8  22.1  22.4  35.9  36.7
(2)  Gini coefficient  for
gross  income  a/  26.1  19.5  24.8  21.7  21.9  35.1  35.4
(Z)-(1)  -0.6  -2.9  -3.0  -0.4  -0.5  -0.8  -1.3
a/ For  Poland,  CSFR,  Bulgaria  and  Russia,  gross  income  (after  payroll
taxes) but  before a  practically  negligible personal income tax. For
Hungary,  UK and  France,  gross  income  before  taxes.
Notes:  Data for  France  are  calculated  from Canceill  (1989).  Data for
the UK calculated  from United  Kingdom  Central Statistical  Office (1992,
Table  4 Appendix  1, p.142).  UK family  allowances  include  non-contributory
child  benefits plus  contributory statutory maternity allowance. For
socialist  countries,  family  allowances  as  defined  in  footnote  14 above.
French  distribution  is of the type D(HIyH)  where y=gross  Income.  UK
distribution  is  of the  type  D(Hlye)  where  ye=equivalent  disposable  Income.
20  Calculated  from  O'Higgins,  Schmaus  and  Stephenson  (1989,  p. 116).
15Family allowances  are strongly pro-poor in absolute terms in all
countries  except  Russia (see Table 4). This means that poor households
receive  more of them not only in relative  terms (i.e.  as share  of their
income) but also in absolute amounts. The poorest households receive
between 3 and 7 times  more that the richest (Figure  4). Pro-p-or  family
allowances,  combined  with  pensions  that  have  positive  and  low
concentration coefficients, thus  produce an  almost  flat  per  capita
distribution  for  all cash  transfers.
Family allowances are  the  only  income source in  East  European
countries  that Is both important  and strongly  focused  on the poor. They
achieve  a significant  reduction  in inequality,  lowering  the overall  Gini
coefficient  by approximately  3 percentage  points  in Hungary  and CSFR,  and
about  half a  point  in  Bulgaria, Poland and  Russia  (Table 7).  For
comparison,  they  reduce  income  inequality  by 1.3  percentage  Gini  points  in
France (where  they are comparable  in size to Central  European  countries)
and  by 0.8  points  in  the  UK.
Figure  4
Family allowances by income decile
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Workers  households  for Poland.
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16Social assistance (including  unemployment benefits) In  socialist
economies  did not have the Importance  that It has in market economies,
neither In its size nor concentration  on  identifying  and helping the
indigent.  This  was due to the  nature  of the  economic  system  where social
support was  in-built  at  the enterprise level. If full employment is
guaranteed,  the  minimum  wage is  sufficient  to  support  a  modest  standard  of
living,  family  allowances  are relatively  high, high participation  rates
obtain,  and  pensions  are linked  to previous  earnings,  poverty  can  be only
an accidental  phenomenon  and  unemployment  assistance  does not exist.  Such
society can be dull  (as indeed socialist societies were) because it
eliminates  the peaks as it eliminates  the troughs but It guarantees  a
minimum Income  to everyone.  An explicit  state  policy toward  poverty was
therefore  not necessary  and indeed  it did not exist.  Anti-poverty  policy
dealt only with "excess"  cases of alcoholics,  handicapped  etc, and was
either undertaken  half-heartedly  by local authorities  or by charitable
organizations  (in countries  where Church involvement,  as in Poland,  was
politically  accepted).
In Czechoslovakia  and Hungary,  social  assistance  accounts  for less
than 1 percent of household  gross income; in Russia, it is negligible
(although  well targeted).  The  data for other  countries  are not available:
a reflection  of social  assistance's  small importance.  By contrast,  social
assistance  and unemployment  benefits in the UK, France and Australia
amount to between  1.3 and 3.2 percent  of household  gross income  and are
fairly  well targeted  (Table  8).
17Table  8. SOCIAL  ASSISTANCE
(in  percentage  of gross  Income;
individuals  or  households  ranked  by gross  per  capita  income)
CSFR  HUN  RUS  UK  FRA  CHI  AUS
1988  1989  1989  1989  1984  1987  1979
Size of social  assistance
All  households  0.4  0.8  0.03  3.2  1.3  0.7  1.6
Concentration  coefficients
Unemployment  benefits  -15.8  -21.3  -62.2  -39.4
Welfare  -70.3  -53.1  -54.9  -30.3
Employment  programs  -49.8
Other  transfers  -19.5  -11.5  -36.6  -44.2  -26.3
Note:  Definitions of  social  assistance. CSFR:  other  benefits.
Hungary:  unemployment  benefits  plus other  benefits.  Russia:  allowance  for
the poor families  with children.  UK: all non-contributory  benefits  minus
child benefits and housing benefits, plus unemployment  compensations.
Chile: unemployment compensation  plus payments from state  employment
programs  plus  direct  family  allowance  ("subsidio  unico  familiar").  France:
other  allowances. Australia: unemployment compensation plus  sickness
benefits plus family allowance  plus other cash benefits (see Kakwani,
1986,  Table  6.3,  p. 95).
Concentration  coefficients.  Australia:  Calculated  from  Kakwani  (1986,
Tables  8.1 and 8.4).Welfare  defined  as the family  allowance.  Sources  for
the  UK and  France  as  given in  Table  7; for  Chile  as given in  Table  6.
French  distribution  is of the type  D(HIyH)  where  y=gross income.  UK
distribution  is  of the  type  D(H|ye)  where  y  e=equivalent  disposable  income.
All  other  distribution  as D(ply  p) where  y=gross  income.
Chilean  data show in addition  that: (1)  public employment  programs
through self-targeting,  (2) welfare programs targeted  on children less
than 15 years of age and pregnant  women or single  mothers who are not
eligible  for  family  allowances  paid to all  employees,  and (3)  unemployment
compensations,  mostly  focused  on the  young,  achieve  very good and similar
results  in terms  of targeting  (concentration  coefficients  between -50  and
-62). It is noteworthy  that none of the programs is based on explicit
income  or means  testing.
18Section  3. Distributional  Incidence  of Social  Transfers  In  Kind
Tables 9 and 10 show the size and concentration  coefficients  for
transfers  in  kind  in  Poland,  former  Yugoslavia,  Hungary  and
Czechoslovakia.  Imputed  value  of  education  benefits  amount  to
approximately  7-8 percent  of household  gross income.  More than  60 percent
of these benefits are accrued at the kindergarten  and primary school
level.  The  degree  of progressivity  of benefits  declines  with the level  of
education.  Most  targeted  are  kindergarten benefits  (concentration
coefficient  between -25 and  -35 for Hungary and CSFR), then primary
education (around -20). Secondary education  benefits are markedly less
focused on the poor: their concentration  coefficients  hover around 0,
indicating  practically  flat distribution.  Finally,  university  education
benefits  are positively  correlated  with level  of income  although  they  are
still relatively  pro-poor,  that is, they are less  unequally  distributed
than gross income (poor households receive more of  them in relative
although not  in absolute amounts). The  data for  Poland and  Hungary
indicate,  however,  than only about 10 percent  of all education  benefits
2  1 are received  at the university  level.  In consequence,  total education
benefits are  pro-poor in absolute terms, more so  in Czechoslovakia,
Hungary  and  Yugoslavia  than in  Poland.
It is sometimes argued that the finding that education benefits
become less progressive  with the level  of education  simply  captures  the
life-cycle  effect,  namely that young parents  with relatively  low income
and still climbing  up their  earning  curve have young children  who go to
kindergartens  or primary schools (Birdsall  and James, 1990,  p. 37). As
parents  age, their  income  increases,  reaching  perhaps  the  peak  at the  time
when children  attend  university,  The life-cycle  effect,  however,  applies
equally  to all studies  of income  inequality.  Paglin (1975)  tried to take
it into  account  by deducting  from  the  area  under  the  standard  Lorenz  curve
the  area showing  age-inequality  (to  account  for the  age-income  profile). 22
Accounting for  the  life-cycle effect, however, makes  sense  only  in
cross-country  comparisons  when (1)  one country (say,  socialist)  displays
21  Since  benefits  are estimated  on the  basis  of costs,  it  means that 10
percent  of costs  are incurred  at that level.
22  Paglin's  approach  was incorrect  (see  Danziger,  Haveman  and Smolensky
1977)  although  the  idea  is clear.
19flat  age-income  profile  and another  (capitalist)  a very steep  one, or  (2)
two countries  have vastly different demographic  profiles. Cor'entional
measures of  inequality In case  (1). based on yearly data, would  be
therefore  biased  in favor  of a socialist  country.  When age-income  profiles
do not differ  much,  Paglin's  approach  Is redundant,  because  our question
Is not, What is life-cycle  ("true")  inequality?,  but, more modestly,  What
is the  distribution  of benefits  between  the  poor and the rich at a given
moment?  Those  who are now poor may later  become  rich  and vice versa.  The
point  is still that today's  poor would be better-off today  If  they
received  more benefits.
Health  care benefits  are, except in Hungary,  greater than education
benefits.  In Poland  and CSFR, they amount  to 12-13  percent of household
income,  almost  9 percent in former  Yugoslavia,  and 6 percent in Hungary.
Health benefits are  by  and  large distributed  uniformly per  capita:
concentration  coefficients  in four countries  are not much different  from
zero.  No marked  difference  is detectable  between  various  types  of health
benefits  in countries  where  such  break-up  is  available.
For comparison,  I  present  the  results  for the  UK and Chile (see  also
Figure  5).  Targeting  in the  area of education  is very similar  to that in
Eastern  Europe.  Education  benefits  overall  are  pro-poor  in absolute  terms,
and  their progressivity  decreases with the level of education.  Chile,
however, differs from Eastern Europe in that the correlation  between
university benefits and  level of  income is much  stronger: education
benefits  at that level  are almost  as skewed  as income.  This implies  that
relatively  few  students  belong  to the  families  that (at  that  point  In time
at least)  are not  well-off.  Because  private  expenditures  on education  are
not included,  the size of education benefits  expressed in relation to
gross Income  is less In  Chile  and the  UK than  in  Eastern  Europe.
20Figure  5
Public education  benefits
(all types of school and free meals)
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20~~~~~2As  for  health  care  benefits, the  results  for  the  UK  and,
particularly,  Chile indicate  much greater  progressivity.  This is due to
the fact that public  expenditures  for health coexist  w'th private,  and
that recipients  of the former  are disproportionately  poor households.  In
socialist  economies,  where  health  is entirely  socialized,  benefits  cannot,
even in theory,  be focused  on the poor, or they can only to the extent
that (1) the poor happen to fall sick more often, or  (2) for  longer
periods,  or from (3) diseases  more expensive  to cure. 'While  it is not
unreasonable  to assume  that  at least  one of the three  elements  does hold,
it ils  also true  that  even in  a fully  socialized  health  service,  the  access
of the  poor to health  care  of a given  quality  will be more difficult  than
for the rich.  This is because  the rich can more easily  bribe doctors  or
provide counter-favors.  The practice  Is quite common in Eastern  Europe.
Elements  (1)-(3)  are therefore  offset  or overwhelmed  by easier  access  for
the rich. Even in theory  health benefits  are therefore  unlikely to be
focused on the poor in a fully socialized  health system: an equal per
capita  distribution  is the best that can be expected, and this is the
result  we obtain (for  Poland  and CSFR, the concentration  coefficient  is
not statistically  significantly  different  from  zero).
22Table  9. SIZE  OF TRANSFERS  IN  KIND
(all  households  original  income  100)
POL  YU  HUN  CSFR  UK  CHI
1989  1988  1989  1988  1989  1987
Education  and  health  18.7  15.9  14.6  21.1  12.0  5.7
Kindergartens  1.2  1.3  0.3
Primary  4.4  3.9  4.1  2.0
Secondary  and  vocational  1.8  2.0  .3.1  0.8
University  0.8  1.1  1.0
Other  training  0.3
Education  7.0  7.1  8.5  8.5  5.2  4.3
Health:  Medical  consultations  1.9
Health:  Clinical  3.2  3.8
Health:  Others  6.6  2.2
Health  care  11.7  8.8  .6.0  12.6  6.8  1.4
Sources: Topinska  (1991), Vukotic-Cotic (1991), Kupa  and  Fajth
(1990),  Dlouhy (1991).  Sources  for the  UK and Chile  as given in Table  8;
education  expenditures  include  subsidized  school  meals.
Table  10.  CONCENTRATION  COEFFICIENTS  OF TRANSFERS  IN  KIND
POL  YU  HUN  CSFR  UK  CHI
1989  1988  1989  1988  1989  1987
Education  and  health  -5.2  -11.4  -4.3  -5.2  -10.0  -16.3
Kindergartens  -24.7  -34.3  -25.9
Primary  -12.6  -20.1  -21.3  -27.0
Secondary  and  vocational  1.7  -7.2  04  -13.4
University  21.6  13.0 >  - 42.9
Other  training  20.0
Education  -4.8  -22.0  -12.0  -15.7  -11.2  -10.0
Health:  Medical  consultations  0.6
Health:  Clinical  -1.8  4.0
Health:  Others  -8.9  3.9
Health  care  -5.4  -2.4  4.0  1.8  -9.0  -36.0
(t-values)a/  (-2.2)  (-2.3) (3.7)  (1.9)
Gross  income  Gini  26.1  32.2  24.8  19.5  35.1  47.9
Sources:  Topinska  (1991,  pp.29-31),  Vukotic-Cotic  (1991,  p.11),  Fajth
and  Kupa (1990),  Dlouhy  (1991,  pp. 13-14).  Sources  for the  UK and  Chile  as
given in  Table  8; education  expenditures  include  subsidized  school  meals.
a/ Standard  errors of concentration  coefficients  for all transfers
are calculated using  the jackknife technique suggested by  Sandstrom,
Wretman  and  Walden (1988,  p.116).
Note: *  =  significant at 5 percent.
=  significant  at 1  percent.
23Section  4.  The  World  of  Welfare  Socialism
Social  transfers  in  socialism  are  almost  flat  per  capita.  The  system
displays  features  that are different  from what is found in market
economies.  Esping-Andersen  (1990)  defines  three  worlds  (arche-types)  of
welfare  capitalism.  They  are  the  liberal  worli  of  residual  social  welfare
where  transfers  are  limited  and  gLnerally  means-tested,  the  conservative
and  corporatist  world  of  sizable  yet  mostly  earning-related  transfers,  and
the socio-democratic  world of big social  transfers  where welfare  is
treated  as  a "universal  right".  In  terms  of  countries,  the  liberal  world
is  confined  to  Anglo-Saxon  countries,  Japan and  Switzerland,  the
conservative  world  to  continental  Europe,  and  the  social-democratic  world
to  Scandinavia  and  the  Netherlands.
Socialist  welfare  system  differs  from  the  three  capitalist  worlds  in
an almost  total  absence  of transfer  targeting.  In terms  of the size  of
transfers  it  stands  between  the  conservative  and  social-democratic  systems
Figure  6
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Figure  5 broadly  accords  with Esping-Andersen's  classification  except
for  a  rather  unique  position  of  the  Swedish  system  whose  key
characteristics  are not shared,  as he argues, by Norway.  US, Canada  and
Israel  have very targeted  systems.  This Is probably  made necessary by
relative  parsimony of their systems.  Britain and Sweden has the least
targeted  system  among  the  mafket  economies.  The UK situation  had somewhat
changed  by the late 1980s  since  the  decrease  in the  size of transfers  was
accompanied  by better  targeting.  24
Flat  transfers preserve  horizontal  equity.  If  transfers are
distributed equally per  capita, income  rankings of  Individuals or
households ranked by  their per  capita  income cannot be  changed.  25
Ranking-reversals  (called  also leap-frogging)  are a serious problem In
Sweden  where  a large  size of transfers  results  in shuffling  the  positions
of income  units  before  and  after  the  transfers.  Leap-frogging  is  excluded,
or at least  is  minimized,  when transfers  are  either  flat,  as in socialism,
or when they are finely  targeted  and of limited  size as in the residual
23  Social transfers  expressed in terms of total household income  are
often  greater  in socialist  than in market  economies  while the reverse  is
true  when transfers  are expressed  In terms  of GDP. Thus for the  period  of
the 1980s,  Rutkowska (1991)  finds that cash social transfers  In Poland,
Hungary,  Czechoslovakia,  and Yugoslavia  averaged  about 10 percent  of GDP
vs. 12 percent for OECD as a whole and 15.8 for social welfare OECD
countries.  In terms  of households  Income,  the difference  is less or Is
moreover  in favor of socialist  countries.  This is due to the fact that
households receive a  smaller portion of  GDP  in  socialism than  in
capitalism:  for example,  almost  all of corporate  saving  and investment  In
socialism  is  not  mediated  through  personal  (household)  income.
24  From Mitchell's  data (Appendix  C, p.221),  in 1979 the concentration
coefficient of  cash  transfers in  the  UK  was  -26.1;  in  1987,  the
concentration coefficient was  -34.5  (calculated  from  United Kingdom
Central Statistical  Office, 1990, Appendix  4, Table 1, p.117). In both
cases,  households  are ranked  according to original  income.  The size of
transfers  was 20.3 percent of gross income  in 1979 and 14.3 percent in
1987.
25  This is in contrast  to the  hypothesis  put forward  by Okrasa  (1988,  p.
637),  namely  that "[r]edistribution  of income  through  social  transfers  in
Poland -and in the East- pays more attention  to vertical  equity across
particular  socio-economic  groups  than  in the  West,  but at the  same time  it
is less successful  in meeting the objective  of horizontal  equity".  The
first  part of the  statement  is  correct  but  not the  second.
25welfare countries.  With the amount of  income redistributed  in Sweden
transfers  would  need, in  order  to  avoid  ranking-reversals,  to be extremely
well-targeted  (paid  only and only to the  very poor)  which means that the
system  would  acquire  liberal  rather  than  socio-democratic  features;  or to
be uniform per capita as in socialism;  or to be so finely calibrated
almost  to the  point  of being  adjusted  for  each individual  which  is clearly
unfeasible.  A recent  study by Ankrom (1990,  p.16),  shows that horizontal
inequity  in  Sweden  is  about three  times  as great  as in the  UK and the  US,
and  6 to 7 times  as great  as In Australia  and  Canada.  Technical  inability
to preserve  income  rankings  once the  overall  size  of transfers  Is too big
can  therefore  be an argument  for  limiting  the  size  of the  welfare  state  to
some  "natural"  size compatible  with  rank  preservation.  26
Section  5. Conclusions:  Lessons  for  the  Transition
Social  cash  transfers  in socialist  economies  in the  years immediately
preceding the collapse of  socialism accounted for  about a  fifth of
population  gross income,  a percentage  comparable  with that in developed
welfare  economies.  They  were  generally  unrelated  to income  levels  and  were
paid in respect  to  demographic  characteristics.  To the  extent  that  some  of
these  characteristics  were correlated  with income  (e.g.  number  of children
is negatively  correlated  to per capita  household  Income)  some transfers
like  family allowances played  a  redistributional  function. Overall,
however,  cash transfers  were paid almost  equally  per capita.  This Is In
marked  contrast  to the situation  In market  economies  where transfers  are
much more  focused  on low-income  households.
An  important  issue during the transition  will be the relationship
between Income  and wage distribution,  on the one hand, and cash social
transfers  on the other.  Currently,  wages and cash transfers  account  for
about  80 percent  of household  gross  income.  The distribution  of both will
change. Wages, are  likely to become more unequal. To  counteract an
increase  in income  disparities,  social  transfers  must become  more focused
on the  poor.
The  relationship between  increased wage  disparity and  better
provision of social support is not novel. During the transition  from
feudalism to capitalism,  the labor market supplanted  personalized  and
26  The assumption  is,  of course,  that  rank  reversals  are  undesirable.
26paternalistic  relationships  and  weakened a  number of  social buffers
(guilds,  family).  The transition  to capitalism  resulted  in an increase  in
the  number  of the  poor because  many could  not command  sufficient  wage in
the labor  market.  This in turn necessitated  that the state  take the role
of provider  of the last resort.  The situation  in countries  in transition
from  socialism  to capitalism  is similar.  In socialism,  social  support  was
built  into  the  system  already  at the  enterprise  level.  Such  a system  where
social  protection  was implicit  is now being replaced  by a market system
where labor  market  plays the key role. Those  who cannot  earn sufficient
wage must  be supported  by the  state.
However  paradoxical  it may seem  at first  sight,  the  state in Eastern
Europe is ill-prepared  for this task.  Although  the role of the state  was
pervasive in socialism,  the state had no experience  in identifying  the
needy,  and administering  and delivering  targeted  support.  Yet the state
will have to take  upon itself  such  a role if transition  to a market  system
is to occur.  The  question  is then,  toward  what  world  of welfare  capitalism
are  East European  countries  likely  to evolve.
The most probable evolution of Central European countries is,  I
think, toward  the corporatist  model of continental  Europe. Countries  of
continental  Europe have large social transfers;  because transfers are
often  related  to previous  earnings  they  have .- ather  limited  redistributive
role and follow more closely social insurance than social assistance
principle.  High trade union density and Catholic  corporatism  are also
features  of this model (see  Esping-Andersen  (1990)).  It would seem that
the three Central  European countries  and the new countries  of Slovenia
and, somewhat  less,  Croatia  do fit into that mold.  Neither the size nor
the main principles  of transfer  determination  would need to be altered
significantly  for Central  European  countries  to resemble  their  capitalist
neighbors.2  Because transfers would derive from past earning records
27  The  position  of Poland  is  more  ambiguous.  Strong  Catholicism  with the
accent  on the role of family  as the  main social  buffer (rather  than the
state),  and the  overcoming  of class  divisions  through  corporatism  seem to
suggest that the Polish case might closely tally the rest of Catholic
Europe (Austria  is the best example).  Recently,  a liberal  Polish social
scientist  Janusz Korwin-Mikke (1992)  wrote that he fears the rise of
"Christian  socialism".  The same view is echoed by Lash (1991,  p. 106):
"Any  pervasive  presence  of confessional  politics  [in  Poland],  such as in
Germany and Holland, makes it very difficult to pursue a  neo-liberal
route. A  strong church usually makes for social cohesion and  strong
"social"  element  to  any  market  economy."  On  the  other  hand,
27(pensions)  when  most people  were  employed  and  wages  were compressed,  or be
based  on categorical  characteristics  (number  of children),  poverty  may be
the  highest  among those  who fall between  the cracks,  e.g. new unemployed
with little  or no previous  job  history,  low-wage  single  parent  households,
or,  as in  Poland,  the  rural  poor  who receive  disproportionately  few social
transfers.  The current  system  would therefore  have to be complemented  by
the  introduction of  several  more  targeted  transfers  (unemployment
benefits,  some  social  assistance).
The  evolution  of the  welfare  systems  in the -ore  agricultural Balkan
countries  and the Slavic republics  of the former Soviet Union is more
difficult  to predict.  Some elements  that  characterize  corporatist  European
systems  are, however,  present  in these  countries  as well. Corporatism  is
closely related, according to  Esping-Anderson,  to etatism manifested
(among  other  things)  in  a more  exalted  position  enjoyed  by civil  servants.
The number of distinct occupational  pension schemes and  the  size of
pension  payments  to former  government  employees  are  thus two  key  variables
correlated  with continental  corporatism.  Such features  existed  and still
exist in the Balkans and Russia. There was historically  a marked split
between  bureaucracy  and the  rest  of the  populace.8 The best  known  example
is  Peter  the  Great's  codification of  the  civil  service positions
(chinovniki)  akin to the one found in the Army, and the linkage  between
the  service  to the  state  and the award  of titles  of nobility.  The legacy
of socialism  has probably  reinforced  strong  pro-etatist  bias. Corporatism
Esping-Andersen  (1990,  p.30)  in  discussing  the  rise  of  the
social-democratic  welfare state in Sweden, puts  the  emphasis on  the
emergence  of a "red-green"  alliance  between  strong  workers'  trade  unions
and farmers.  Such an alliance  traded  generous  welfare system  for workers
with subsidies for farmers. An incipient  alliance of that kind is in
evidence in Poland. The alliance  might tilt the system toward a more
universalist  stance,  closer  to the  socio-democratic  model.
28  "The  Balkan  official  regards  himself  as immeasurably  superior  to the
peasants,  among  whom  he lives  and  from  whose  ranks  he has  sprung.  To be an
official  is the fondest  dream of every able young son of a peasant.  The
Balkan official  does not like to work. He considers  himself so fine a
fellow  that the state  should  be proud to support  him for life  and should
not ask  him to make efforts  that tax  his intellect  or character...  Outside
[offices]  stand,  sit or squat patient  queues of peasants  awaiting  their
various permits and  receipts. Foreigners and  citizens with protekcJa
obtain swift and prompt attention,  but the people can wait. They have
waited  many  hundreds  of years  already  for  justice  and a fe  more hours  will
not make much difference."  (Hugh  Seton-Watson  quoted in Polonsky, 1980,
p.6).
28is In evidence,  for example,  in present-day  Greece  where  no less than  330
occupational  pension schemes exist: government  employees are generally
privileged.  An important  difference  between,  on the  one hand,  the  Central
European  countries, and,  on  the  other,  Balkan  countries, Russia,
Byelorussia  and the Ukraine,  resides  in the latter  group's lower  ability
to administer  welfare  schemes  and deliver  social  support.  An increase  in
poverty  can then be expected  with all the  attendant  effects  on political
stability.  Transition  in the  Southern  tier  countries  and the  former  Soviet
Slavic  republics  will  probably  prove  to be socially  and  politically  a much
more troubled  process  than  in  Central  Europe.
29ANNEX  1  - CHARACTERISTICS  OF SURVEYS  AND  ADEQUACY  OF DATA
Data sources
For our analysis  we use household surveys data published by the
central statistical  offices of five countries.The  publications  used are
the following.  For Poland,  the data are published  in Budzety  Gospodarstw
Domowych  v  1989 Roku, Warsaw: Central  Statistical  Office, 1990. In our
analysis we use  the unpublished  decile data supplied by  the Central
Statistical  Office.  For Yugoslavia,  the  data come  from Anketa  o potrosnji
domacinstava  u 1988:  Raspoloziva  i  upotrebijena  sredstva:  Proseci  po clanu
domacinstva,  Statistical  Bulletin  No.1788,  Belgrade:  Federal Office of
Statistics,  1989.  For  Czechoslovakia,  the  data  are  published  in
Mikrocensus  1989:1.dil,  Prague:  Federal  Statistical  Office,  1990.  Data for
Hungary  and Bulgaria  were supplied  by  the  countries'  Central  Statistical
Office  (CSO)  on computer  spreadsheets  and  are  available  from  the  author  on
request.  The  Russian  data are taken  from Popkin (1992).  They are derived
from Consumer  Budget Survey for 1989 combined  with one-million  sample
Survey  of Incomes  conducted  by the  Russian  State  Statistical  Bureau.
Yugoslav,  Polish and Bulgarian  surveys are conducted  annually. In
1988-89 they  covered respectively 18650, 28285  and  2720  households
(representing  approximately  0.3,  0.25  and  0.09  percent  of all  households).
Yugoslav  and  Polish  surveys  have  been frequently  used by the  researchers.
They are  considered fairly representative  and  reliable even  if  not
entirely  free of problems.  For example,  the definition  of income  in the
Yugoslav survey is incorrect since the concept used is more akin to
revenues. In Poland, surveys cover about 90 percent of the population,
leaving  out non-agricultural  private sector,  Army and police personnel.
Bulgarian  and Russian surveys follows the so-called "branch  principle"
which means that households  are selected at  the place of work. This
provides  for a good check  of wage data but biases  the results  since  some
household  incomes  are unreported  (the  survey  relies  only on recollections
of one member of the household)  and some groups are under represented
(private  sector  workers).  Also,  pensioners  households  are not included  as
integral  part of the survey  but are added on as their  data are derived
from  a special  subsurvey  of pensioners.
Czechoslovak  survey is a periodic  survey.  The last survey  prior to
the  one in 1988  was conducted  in 1985.  The 1988 survey  includes  about  1.9
30percent of all households.  Hungarian data originate from two separate
sources. The  first is  the  1987 income survey done on  about  22,000
households  (0.55  percent  of all households).  Income  surveys  are conducted
every  five years.  The second  is the 1989  household  budget  survey.  Budget
surveys  are  done  every  two  years  on about  12,000  households.  Hungarian  CSO
analysts  hold that income  surveys  provide  better  income  data  while  budget
surveys  are  deemed  more  reliable  for  expenditures.  Using
micro-simulations,  CSO  updated  earning/income  figures  from  the 1987  income
survey  to obtain income  estimates  for 1989.  CSO thus also accounted  for
the impact  of personal  income  taxation  introduced  in 1988.  A statistical
reweighting  was then  undertaken  to reconcile  the  updated  income  survey  and
the  budget  survey  and  produce  a single  set  of  data.
Ranking  of Recipients
Polish  and  Hungarian  data rank  individuals  into  ten  deciles  according
to  respectively gross  and  disposable income per  household member.
Yugoslav,  Bulgarian  and Czechoslovak  surveys rank households  and, since
the  data  on average  household  size  are  provided,  also  individuals  into  ten
(Yugoslavia  and Bulgaria)  and twenty-five  (CSFR)  income  groups according
to  gross  income  (revenue  for  Yugoslavia)  per household  member.
The  Definition  of Income
The problem  of what constitutes  income  is, in addition  to the usual
reasons  (e.g.  treatment  of capital  gains,  distinction  between  nominal  and
real  return  on assets  etc),  compounded  because  of (1)  income  earned  in the
second (underground)  economy, (2) unsatisfactory  design of the surveys
which mix household  income  with revenues  such as those  derived  from the
sale of assets,  and (3)  exclusion  of practically  all implicit  sources  of
income  except  for  consumption  in  kind.
The  first  problem  is  satisfactorily  dealt  with  only in  Hungary.  Other
countries  do not attempt to measure tips, "black  incomes"  or to account
for  possible  underestimation  of income  by the  households.
The  secqnd problem--bad design  of  the  surveys--is present  in
Yugoslavia.  Yugoslav survey, for example, includes as part of  income
personal  borrowing,  withdrawals  from saving  accounts,  and revenues  from
lease  or sale  of property.  The  first  two  items  are  not  part of income.  The
last item represents  a mixture  of reduction  in the value  of property  and
income (leasing).  A  related problem is lack of  coverage of property
incomes and,  in particular, income from financial assets. Only  the
31Hungarian  survey includes  the latter.  Other surveys  provide information
(withdrawals  from  saving  accounts) which  can,  after  making  some
assumptions  about the  relationship  between  the  average  stock  of deposits,
withdrawals,  and interest  received,  be used to estimate  the  value  of real
interest  received.  However,  since in 1988 and 1989  real interest  rate on
household  deposits  was negative  or at best zero in all the countries  it
was not  necessary  to  make the  adjustment  (even  if  strictly  speaking  income
should  be reduced  when real interest  is negative).  None of the surveys
attempts  to measure  net return  on foreign  exchange  which, in the absence
of other  financial  instruments,  was often  the  most  preferred  hedge  against
inflation.
A more  fundamental  problem  is suitability  of using  money  income  alone
(adjusted  or unadjusted  for the  illicit  incomes)  to measure  inequality  in
conditions  where  there  is rationing,  subsidization  and  widespread  payments
in kind. To quote Bergson (1984,  p. 1058) "(w)ith  prices  below clearing
levels,  money income  ceases to be the sole determinant  of capacity to
acquire goods; to a  degree, fortitude in searching out  supplies and
standing in queues, and plain luck, become consequential".  Households
receive implicit income from consumer subsidies (holding  prices below
equilibrium  levels),  below-market  rents,  negative  interest  rates  charged
on consumer  loans, "collective  consumption"  (enterprise  financed  health
care, cafeterias,  vacations  etc) or special,  often in-kind,  bonuses  and
premia. On  the other hand, households' income was  implicitly  reduced
through  financial  repression  (payment  of negative  interest  rates  on saving
deposits)  and inflation  tax  on money.
Subsidies  paid out  by the  state  to cover  the  difference  between  costs
of production  and retail  prices of consumer  goods (inclusive  of housing
subsidies) give an  indication  of  the size of  of  transfers. Because
equilibrium  prices of some of the subsidized  products  and services  are
greater  than their  costs  of production  (as  is the case,  for example,  for
housing or  electricity  where explicit subsidies cover only operating
costs),  explicit  subsidies  represent  a lower  limit  of actual  transfers.
As  Table Al shows, explicit subsidies ranged, in  terms of  GDP,
between  6 and 7  percent  and in terms  of households'  gross  incomes  amounted
to twice that percentage.  Only in Yugoslavia,  explicit subsidies  were
negligible.
32Table  Al:  EXPLICIT  (PAID-OUT)  CONSUMER  SUBSIDIES  a/
In  percent  In  percent  of
of GDP  household  gross  income
Poland (1989)  6.7  13.8
Hungary (1989)  6.7  12.4
Czechoslovakia  (1988)  5.8  12.9
Bulgaria  (1990)  3.2  n.a.
a/ Excludes agricultural  subsidies to producers and subsidies to
loss-makers.
Note:  Poland:  food,  transport and  housing  subsidies. Hungary:
consumer  and housing loan subsidies (from  OECD, 1991, Table 10, p.64).
Czechoslovakia:  negative  turnover  tax (consumer  subsidies)  plus subsidies
for housing,  residential  heating and urban transport.  Bulgaria:  consumer
subsidies  for  "essential"  products  (from  World  Bank  1991a,
p.38).
The pervasiveness  of the system--subsidized  vacations  for workers,
special shops stocked with unavailable consumer durables for miners,
etc--does  not allow  one to  assert,  as it is sometimes  done,  that  inclusion
of implicit  incomes  would  necessarily  increase  income  disparity.  On the
contrary, there is strong evidence that consumer subsidies,  easily the
largest  chunk  of implicit  income,  have  an opposite  effect  which is likely
to offset  that  of the  nomenklatura  perks.
Using  estimates by  Matthews  (1978) and  various  data  on  the
nomenklatura  perks in Poland, Morrisson (1984)  estimates  an alternative
income  distribution  in Eastern  Europe  which includes  the monetized  value
of fringe  benefits  appropriated  by the  nomenklatura.  Morrisson's  results
(1984,  Table  2) suggest  that the  Gini coefficient  increases  by 3 to  4 Gini
points.  On the other hand, consumer  subsidies  are income-equalizers  and
due to their size exert  a significant  impact  on income  distribution.  It
was  calculated for  Poland in  1987  that  that  inclusion of  consumer
subsidies  reduces income inequality,  measured by the Gini coefficient,
from 21.8 to 20.0. Kupa and Fajth (1990,  p.37) similarly  calculate  for
29  An exaggerated  perception  of  the nomenklatura  fringe benefits is
common in Eastern Europe. It is due to often secretive  nature in which
these benefits were distributed.  This has  led people to ascribe them
greater  importance  than  they  really  had.
33Hungary that the Gini coefficient  is reduced from 23.1 (for disposable
income)  to 22.0 (for  disposable  income  plus subsidies).  Finally,  for CSFR,
some  preliminary  evidence  points  to the  same  conclusion:  negative  turnover
tax (a type of consumer subsidy)  represents  7.1 percent of households'
expenditures  in the lowest  and 4.4 percent in the highest income  decile
(World  Bank, 1991,  p.59).  On the  basis of household  expenditure  surveys,
Vecernik  (1991, p.17)  calculates that  lowest quartile of  households
received  per  capita  7.5  percent  more food  subsidies  than  the  average  while
the top quartile received  6.1 percent less than the average.30  Similar
results  were obtained  for  Algeria  (Stanovnik,  1991,  p. 41).
The  inclusion of  consumer subsidies on  top  of  the  nomenklatura
in-kind  benefits  would probably  bring the Gini coefficient  close to its
"money incomes  only" value. It can be thus argued that the use money
income  yields  an accurate  picture  of income  inequality  even in socialist
economies.  Moreover as far as international  comparisons  are concerned,
similar adjustments for  in-kind benefits could  easily  increase the
measured inequality  in market economies.  In some countries (e.g.  Japan)
fringe  benefits  of r.i"  management  often  exceed  their  salaries  while the
offsetting effects (on income distribution)  of consumer subsidies are
negligible.  31
30  The implicit  assumption  is that  households  with  different  incomes  pay
the  same  average  price  for the  subsidized  good. In  other  words,  if they  do
not buy the entire quantity  at the subsidized  price,  the percentages  of
consumption  at subsidized  and free-market  price are independent  of the
level  of income.
31  Note that social transfers  to the poor are largely  monetized and
already  included  in the  money  income.
34ANNEX  2: THE  DEFINITION  OF CONCEPTS  USED
The concentration  coefficient  C is a synthetic  indicator  showing  the
concentration  of an income  source  x when recipients  are ranked  by amounts
of y (say,  disposable  income).  Graphically,  when cumulative  percentage  of
recipients (ranked according to y)  are  shown on  the  abscissa, and
cumulative  percentages  of x  are shown on  the ordinate, the line that
connects the two is called the concentration  curve. The concentration
coefficient  is equal  to twice  the  area that  lies  between  the  concentration
curve  and the  450 line (line  of equality).  The concentration  curve  can lie
below (above)  the line of equality. In the special case when x=y, the
concentration  coefficient Is equal to  the Gini  coefficient,  and  the
concentration  curve  is  called  the  Lorenz  curve.
There are many formulas  for the calculation  of the concentration
(Gini)  coefficients.  When the  data are grouped (presented  as the averages
for different income  groups which is a normal practice in statistical
publications) a  lower  and  upper  bound  of  the  concentration (Gini)
coefficient  can be  calculated.  The  lower bound  is calculated  on  the
assumption  that  all recipients  within  an income  group  have the  same  amount
of x or  y (as  the  case  may  be). The  formula  is:
n
C =  1-  - ft (qt  +  qt- 1)  (Al)
t=l
where  ft=proportion  of  recipients in  income group  t,  qt=cumulative
proportion  of income  source  x received  by people  in income  groups  0 to t,
and  n =  total  number  of income  groups.
The coefficient  calculated  by (Al)  is an approximation,  based  on the
grouped  data,  of the  sample  concentration  coefficient.
The concentration  coefficient  ranges  from -1  when all (say)  transfers
are received  by the poorest individual  through 0 when all individuals
receive  the same amount  of transfer  income,  to +1 when all transfers  are
received  by the  richest  individual.  When the concentration  coefficient  is
0, it  coincides  with the  450  line.  When it lies  above  the  line  of equality
it is negative;  when it lies  below the line  of equality,  it is positive.
The  Gini coefficient  ranges  from  0 to +1.
35If total disposable Income (y) Is equal to the sum of different
s
income  sources (x )  y =  Z  xi and recipients  are ranked  according  to the
1-1
disposable  income then the the Gini coefficient (G  y) is equal to the
weighted  sum  of concentration  coefficients  of income  sources  where  weights
(wI)  are  shares  of income  sources  in disposable  income:
s
G  =  x  w  C  (A2)
1=1 
where  s =  total  number  of income  sources.
Similarly,  the weighted  sum of concentration  coefficients  of Income
sources  of original  income  will be equal  to the  concentration  coefficient
of the  original  income  (CO):
s'
C  =  W.C.  (A3)
0  i1  1
where  s' =  total  number  of income  sources  in  original  Income.
All concentration  and Gini coefficients  in the paper are multiplied
by 100.
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